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Toward a Theory of Extraterritoriality 
Mark Gibney† 
I have been asked to provide a brief response to Jeffrey 
Meyer’s Dual Illegality and Geoambiguous Law: A New Rule 
for Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law. In this Article, 
Meyer provides a convincing argument of the need for a broad-
er theoretical approach and understanding regarding the ambit 
of U.S. law. As a means of accomplishing this, Meyer proposes 
a territorial reading of “geoambiguous” statutes unless there is 
a prima facie U.S. interest that is involved and the conduct be-
ing regulated is also regulated by another state.  
Notwithstanding many shared concerns, I am not con-
vinced that Meyer achieves what he sets out to do. In particu-
lar, by limiting his analysis solely to geoambiguous statutes, he 
does not provide the broader theoretical framework that he 
promises, and which is needed in this realm. I attempt to pro-
vide at least some of this, positing that the appropriate place to 
start is not with U.S. law but with American obligations under 
international law; and rather than limiting its role to discern-
ing congressional intent, the judiciary is uniquely placed for 
ensuring that such obligations are met.  
I.  DEFINING THE PROBLEM AND MEYER’S PROPOSED 
SOLUTION   
Whatever else you might say about it, the geographic scope 
of U.S. law was certainly much clearer a century ago than it is 
today. In the 1909 case of American Banana Co. v. United Fruit 
Co., the U.S. Supreme Court was faced with the issue of wheth-
er the Sherman Antitrust Act applied to business operations in 
Central America, albeit to the monopolistic practices of two 
 
†  Mark Gibney is the Belk Distinguished Professor and Professor of Po-
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U.S.-based corporations.1 In writing for the Court, Justice Oliv-
er Wendell Holmes not only rejected this claim, but he seemed 
genuinely surprised that this question would even be raised in 
the first place:  
It is obvious that, however stated, the plaintiff ’s case depends on sev-
eral rather startling propositions. In the first place the acts causing 
the damage were done, so far as appears, outside the jurisdiction of 
the United States and within that of other states. It is surprising to 
hear it argued that they were governed by the act of Congress.2 
Holmes then went on to enunciate what seemed to be an 
absolute rule of law: “The general and almost universal rule is 
that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be de-
termined wholly by the law of the country where the act is 
done.”3 Yet, almost immediately thereafter, the Court began to 
carve out a number of exceptions to this “rule,” particularly as 
it became clearer that practices occurring outside the territorial 
boundaries of the United States could have a decidedly nega-
tive effect on American business interests. In due time, not only 
was U.S. antitrust law (the very same Sherman Act that was at 
issue in American Banana) given an extraterritorial applica-
tion,4 but so were such things as U.S. trademark law5 and U.S. 
security law.6  
 
 1. Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 354–55 (1909). 
 2. Id. at 355. 
 3. Id. at 356. 
 4. Notwithstanding the absolute language in American Banana, the 
Court soon began to erode the territoriality principle, first in cases involving 
the transportation of goods to and from the United States. In United States v. 
Pacific & Arctic Railway & Navigation Co., 228 U.S. 87, 104 (1913), the Court 
applied U.S. antitrust law to a Canadian company’s conspiracy to monopolize 
rail transportation between the United States and Canada. In United States v. 
Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 276 (1927), the Court applied U.S. antitrust 
laws to a monopoly in Mexico, holding that the monopolization conspiracy was 
furthered by agreements made in the United States, and that an export mono-
poly would have direct effects within the United States. 
The transformation was completed in United States v. Aluminum Co. of 
America, 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945), where the Second Circuit, sitting as 
a court of last resort because the Supreme Court could not muster a quorum, 
held that the Sherman Act applied extraterritorially to a Canadian corpora-
tion’s participation outside the United States in an international aluminum 
cartel. Employing what later became known as the “effects test,” the court, in 
an opinion by Judge Learned Hand, permitted the extraterritorial application 
of U.S. antitrust laws to conduct that had sufficient contact with the United 
States, even if none of the events comprising the monopoly occurred in this 
country. Id.  
 5. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 289 (1952). 
 6. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 perfectly exemplifies the ex-
traordinary confusion that marks this realm. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 
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Yet while certain aspects of federal law have been given an 
extraterritorial reading, especially U.S. criminal law and busi-
ness regulatory practices, other areas of law have been kept 
stateside. Perhaps the most notable (and notorious) example of 
this occurred in Sale v. Haitian Center Council, Inc.,7 where, in 
an 8-1 opinion, the Supreme Court ruled that the prohibition 
against nonrefoulement under U.S. refugee law did not apply 
outside the country’s territorial boundaries.8 In that way, the 
Court upheld the government’s policy of returning boatpeople 
to Haiti, no matter what fate might await them upon their 
forced return.  
No rule of law has replaced American Banana. Instead, the 
Supreme Court has worked under two guiding principles. The 
first is that Congress has the authority to apply any and all 
U.S. law beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States, 
if it so chooses. However, what tempers this proposition is the 
second principle, which is that all federal law will have a pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality.9 
 
(1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1988)). The Act is only 
applicable when the “means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of 
the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange” have been em-
ployed. 15 U.S.C. § 78j. The Act defines “interstate commerce” as any “trade, 
commerce, transportation, or communication . . . between any foreign country 
and any State . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(5). However, the Act exempts from 
its coverage “any person insofar as he transacts a business in securities with-
out the jurisdiction of the United States . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b). 
Despite all this confusing jurisdictional language, several federal courts 
have given the Act an extraterritorial reading, although a few courts have 
readily admitted that it is not clear how and why. See, e.g., Cont’l Grain Pry. v. 
Pac. Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 421 (8th Cir. 1979) (“We frankly admit that 
the finding of subject matter jurisdiction in the present case is largely a policy 
decision.”); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir. 1975) 
(“We freely acknowledge that if we were asked to point to language in the sta-
tutes, or even in the legislative history, that compelled these conclusions 
[extraterritorially], we would be unable to respond.”).  
 7. 509 U.S. 155 (1993). 
 8. Id. at 159. 
 9. As a side note, it should be pointed out that although the Supreme 
Court will frequently make reference to this presumption, there are also in-
stances when there is no mention of it. In addition, what is needed to over-
come this presumption is not always clear, and reasonable people can differ 
(and, based on the Court’s jurisprudence, have differed) on when this pre-
sumption has been overcome. John Knox has summed up the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence in this entertaining, but illuminating, fashion: 
[I]t has indicated that the presumption against extraterritoriality 
does, and does not, apply to situations outside the sovereign territory 
of the United States but within its control. It has sometimes overcome 
or avoided the presumption when extraterritorial actions cause effects 
in the United States, but its standard statement of the presumption 
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The key, then, is congressional intent. Unfortunately, as 
Jeffrey Meyer shows in his very useful Appendix, in many in-
stances there is simply no clear indication that Congress has 
even thought about the geographic scope of the legislation be-
fore it. Meyer coins a clever but accurate term for this: a 
geoambiguous statute. He accurately chronicles not only the 
enormous inconsistencies that now exist in this area of law, but 
he has also added an important theoretical dimension by plac-
ing scholars (and, presumably, judges) into one of three camps. 
First, there is “judicial unilaterialism,” which calls for a liberal 
extraterritorial extension of U.S. law. In opposition to this ap-
proach is “judicial territorialism,” which adopts a Holmes-like 
approach. Finally, there is “judicial interests balancing.” This 
latter group takes its cue from the American Law Institute’s 
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations, calling for the extra-
territorial application of U.S. law, but only when in the balance 
of all interests it would be “reasonable” to do so.  
Meyer seems to think that these various schools are talk-
ing past one another (they are), and what he proposes is a new 
rule for geoambiguous statutes that would incorporate ele-
ments of at least the first two schools. According to this propos-
al, in cases of geographic uncertainty, a federal statute would 
be given a territorial reading unless (1) there exists some prima 
facie U.S. interest, based on one of the traditional jurisdictional 
grounds under international law (beyond territory)—
nationality, effects, protective, or universal jurisdiction; and (2) 
the conduct being regulated under U.S. law is also regulated in 
this other state. Meyer terms this the dual-illegality rule, liken-
ing it to the comparable provision in extradition law.  
One has to praise Meyer for being willing to recognize the 
crapshoot that the law in this realm has turned into. Moreover, 
this is a thoughtful and oftentimes useful study that is intent 
 
makes no exception for such internal effects. Its decisions have 
treated foreign ships within U.S. territory as subject to a presumption 
against extraterritoriality, a presumption against interference with 
their “internal affairs,” a presumption against interference with their 
maritime operations, a balancing test to determine whether U.S. law 
should apply, and no presumption at all. The Court has said that the 
presumption may be overcome only by a clear statement of congres-
sional intent, that the statutory structure, legislative history, and 
agency interpretations are relevant, and that some circumstances 
may justify extending law extraterritorially without any direct evi-
dence of legislative intent at all. Lower courts have reflected and am-
plified this incoherence. 
John Knox, A Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 351, 
351–52 (2010). 
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in bringing to this realm some much needed theoretical discip-
line. Finally, in terms of the proposal itself, while Meyer never 
fully explains how and why U.S. law should necessarily super-
sede foreign law when dual-illegality does exist (and one of the 
jurisdictional grounds has been met), he is indeed correct that 
another country would have less reason to complain about U.S. 
law violating its national sovereignty when that state already 
regulates a particular area.  
Yet, in the name of reining in the imperialism of American 
law, Meyer’s proposal would oftentimes help perpetuate Ameri-
can imperialism more generally. In order to show this, let me 
use an example that received some press coverage several years 
ago involving Southern Peru Copper, a U.S.-based multination-
al corporation. According to a New York Times story,10 South-
ern Peru Copper had been forced to shut down one of its plants 
in the United States because it was not able to comply with 
EPA standards. However, the plant was reassembled in Ilo, Pe-
ru, where it went into operation once more—spewing out more 
than 2000 tons of sulfur dioxide a day, or somewhere in the 
range of ten to fifteen times what is permissible under federal 
(U.S.) EPA standards. The basis of the newspaper story had 
nothing to do with the possible extraterritorial application of 
U.S. environmental law, but rather, the severe environmental 
and health effects that the plant’s operations had on the resi-
dents of Ilo. As the story reports: 
At times, the smoke from the smelter is so thick that it hovers over 
the city like a heavy fog, forcing motorists to turn on their headlights 
during the day and sending residents to hospitals and clinics cough-
ing, wheezing and vomiting. On those days, children are told to play 
indoors.11  
The accompanying photos gave testament to these claims.  
The point is that while the United States has well-
developed environmental standards, Peru does not. And be-
cause of this, a U.S.-based corporation that could no longer op-
erate in the United States is free to do so in Peru. Meyer’s pro-
posal, at least as I read it, would allow this practice to continue. 
Thus, although U.S. environmental law would seem to qualify 
 
 10. Calvin Sims, In Peru, a Fight for Fresh Air, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1995, 
at C1, available at 1995 WLNR 3863699. For a more detailed analysis of this, 
see MARK GIBNEY, FIVE UNEASY PIECES: AMERICAN ETHICS IN A GLOBALIZED 
WORLD 23–26 (2005).  
 11. Sims, supra note 10.  
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as being “geoambiguous,”12 and notwithstanding the existence 
of a jurisdictional link to the United States (the nationality of 
Southern Peru Copper), the dual illegality requirement would 
not apply, meaning that American environmental law would 
not govern the operation of the plant. The sad truth, of course, 
is that no law is in place to protect the residents of Ilo.  
But all this has a certain fictional quality to it because 
there has never been any serious consideration of applying U.S. 
environmental law to Ilo, Peru, or anywhere else outside the 
United States. What does not matter is the nationality of the 
corporate actor, the amount of environmental harm that U.S.-
based corporations might be causing, or the fact that the host 
state (such as Peru) might not have a single environmental 
regulation. The ready response—one that Holmes himself 
might have uttered—is that U.S.-based corporations such as 
Southern Peru Copper are beyond the regulatory capacity of 
the U.S. government when they are operating in another coun-
try. 
While there is a certain intuition to this position—just as 
there is a certain intuition to the idea that each state’s laws 
have no effect beyond the state’s territorial borders—the truth 
is that U.S.-based corporations operating in other countries are 
already regulated by a host of domestic (U.S.) law. Without at-
tempting to provide an exhaustive list, this includes: U.S. se-
curities law, U.S. trademark law, U.S. tax law, U.S. bribery 
law, U.S. age discrimination law (at least with respect to Amer-
ican citizens), and U.S. civil rights law (again, only with respect 
to American citizens).  
In contrast to this, U.S. environmental law has been kept 
within the territorial boundaries of the United States. Whether 
this is the intent of Congress remains unclear. However, what 
is clear is that U.S.-based multinational corporations have been 
given license under federal law to inflict widespread environ-
mental harm upon people in other countries. Of course, other 
 
 12. Most of the litigation in this area has revolved around the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–79 (1982). Al-
though NEPA is replete with extraterritorial language “recognizing the . . . 
critical importance of restoring and maintaining environmental quality to the 
overall welfare and development of man,” the statute has generally been given 
a territorial reading. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a); see also Natural Res. Def. Council v. 
Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 647 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Amlon Metals, 
Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Greenpeace v. Stone, 748 
F. Supp. 749 (D. Haw. 1990). But see Envtl. Defense Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 
528 (D.C. Cir. 1993).  
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developed states would be able to prevent this from taking 
place. This is the reason why Southern Peru Copper would 
never be able to relocate its plant in a country like France. 
However, there are a host of other countries that do not have 
the same environmental regulatory practices as France or the 
United States. Yet, even in those situations the jurisdiction of 
U.S. environmental law remains subject to territorial restric-
tions. And at the end of the day, while it is illegal for agents of 
a U.S.-based corporation to offer a bribe to a foreign official 
(even if bribery is perfectly legal in this other state), it is not il-
legal under U.S. law for this same corporation to wreck all 
kinds of environmental damage on the citizens of some other 
country.  
I share Meyer’s view that this area of law is in desperate 
need of much more theoretical understanding, but I am not 
convinced that his proposal does this. Most notably, it dutifully 
accepts the premise that Congress has the authority to extend 
any and all U.S. law if it so chooses to do so, so long as the geo-
graphic scope of the statute is unambiguous. In addition, Meyer 
apparently would also allow for the selective application of U.S. 
law so that it only applies to American nationals, which mirrors 
current civil rights and antidiscrimination legislation.  
II.  DEFINING THE SCOPE OF U.S. LAW IN TERMS OF 
AMERICAN OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW   
My substantive field of interest and expertise is human 
rights, and the general problem that I see is that nearly all of 
the attention is given to the enforcement of U.S. law, while al-
most no attention is given to the protections under the law—
either statutory protections or protections under the Constitu-
tion itself. Thus, to go back to the Haitian boatpeople example, 
what the Supreme Court never bothered to question was 
whether the U.S. Coast Guard had the legal authority to patrol 
the Atlantic Ocean and halt private boats that it found on the 
seas. That power was assumed. Rather, the only extraterritori-
al issue addressed by the Court was whether the protection 
against sending an individual to a country where his/her life or 
freedom would be threatened applied to desperate people on the 
high seas and the Court’s answer was that it did not. It is not 
clear to me whether the 1980 Refugee Law would qualify as a 
“geoambiguous” statute or not (although in my own view there 
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is nothing ambiguous about this)13, but my strong sense is that 
Meyer’s proposal would jibe with the Court’s ruling in this case.  
Rather than adhering to two principles that have no theo-
retical basis and which the Court only invokes on occasion, a 
sounder approach would be to ensure that the extraterritorial 
application of U.S. law is consonant with international law. In 
the first instance, U.S. law should only apply where there is a 
jurisdictional basis for doing so. However, whenever and whe-
rever U.S. law is applied outside the country’s territorial bor-
ders—regardless of whether there is a jurisdictional basis for 
doing so—enforcement must be accompanied by protections 
under the law. The two cannot be kept separate and distinct, as 
they have been in the past. Furthermore, the extraterritorial 
application of U.S. law must be done within the framework of 
American legal obligations under international law more broad-
ly. I will use two examples from the human rights field to illu-
strate this. 
 
 13. The crux of the case concerned the geographic scope of the nonre-
foulement provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952 § 243(h)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1988 
& Supp. IV 1992) (current version at INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)); 
Sale, 509 U.S. at 158. At the time of the Sale litigation, that provision read: 
“The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien . . . to a country if the 
Attorney General determines that such alien’s life or freedom would be threat-
ened in such country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion.” Id. (quoting INA § 243(h)(1)). 
  The original 1952 version of this provision included the phase any 
alien “within the United States.” Id. at 168 n.16. However, during the passage of 
the 1980 Refugee Act, this language was removed, while the phrase “or return” 
was added. Id. at 176. What is also noteworthy is that prior to 1980, relief un-
der§ 243 was discretionary. See id. at 158 n.2 (comparing then-current ver-
sion’s use of “shall” and prior version’s lack of mandatory language).  
  Notwithstanding these amendments, the Court held that the nonre-
foulement provision remained territorial: 
The addition of the phrase “or return” and the deletion of the phrase 
“within the United States” are the only relevant changes made by the 
1980 amendment to § 243(h)(1), and they are fully explained by the 
intent to apply § 243(h) to exclusion as well as to deportation proceed-
ings. That intent is plainly identified in the legislative history of the 
amendment. There is no change in the 1980 amendment, however, 
that could only be explained by an assumption that Congress also in-
tended to provide for the statute’s extraterritorial application. It 
would have been extraordinary for Congress to make such an impor-
tant change in the law without any mention of that possible effect. 
Not a scintilla of evidence of such an intent can be found in the legis-
lative history. 
Id. at 176 (footnote omitted). 
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The first involves the prohibition against torture.14 Torture 
is illegal everywhere and at all times, and what does not mat-
ter is whether it is carried out inside a state’s borders or out-
side its territory.15 This means that it simply does not matter 
whether domestic legislation implementing a treaty such as the 
Torture Convention is “geoambiguous”—even if such a law 
purposely sought to limit the prohibition to the domestic realm. 
What also would not matter is if the domestic legislation sought 
to selectively limit the prohibition so that it only applied to citi-
zens of that state. Finally, it would not matter whether other 
countries also had laws prohibiting torture. The larger point is 
that there is no reason why the legislative body should be the 
sole authority on when, where, and in what manner U.S. law is 
applied extraterritorially. Rather, the judiciary has an impor-
tant role to play well beyond attempting to divine the geograph-
ic intent of Congress. One could even make the claim that the 
judiciary’s role in this context is even more vital than it is in 
the domestic realm because of the complete absence of demo-
cratic representation and accountability inherent in the extra-
territorial context.16 
The second example involves the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).17 Although 
the United States is not a state party, it has signed the cove-
 
 14. Although torture is prohibited in a number of international and re-
gional instruments, as well as under customary international law, the main 
body of law is the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 
U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force June 26, 1987) [hereinafter Torture Convention]. 
 15. Although outside the scope of the present work, there is much that 
U.S. lawmakers and judges can learn from the approach taken by the Human 
Rights Committee, the United Nations treaty body that interprets and en-
forces the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 
19, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
The ICCPR is explicitly restricted to “individuals within its territory and sub-
ject to its jurisdiction . . . .” Id. art. 2(1). Yet, rather than giving the ICCPR a 
territorial reading, the HRC has clarified that each state party “must respect 
and ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant to anyone within the power 
or effective control of that State Party, even if not situated within the territory 
of the State Party.” U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31, 
The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the 
Covenant, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. CCRR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004).  
 16. For a further analysis of this point see Mark P. Gibney, The Extrater-
ritorial Application of U.S. Law: The Perversion of Democratic Governance, the 
Reversal of Institutional Roles, and the Imperative of Establishing Normative 
Principles, 10 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 297 (1996). 
 17. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
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nant and thus is obligated to act in good faith to refrain from 
acts calculated to frustrate the objectives of the treaty.18 Each 
state party is obligated to respect, protect, and fulfill all treaty 
obligations19—not just within the domestic realm but outside 
the country’s borders as well.20 Under the duty to respect, a 
state is itself prohibited from violating economic, social, and 
cultural rights (ESCR); under the duty to protect, a state has 
an obligation to ensure that third parties, including individuals 
and corporations, do not violate ESCR; and finally, under the 
duty to fulfill, the state has an obligation to provide goods and 
materials when individuals are not able to meet their own 
ESCR themselves.  
Under the Charming Betsy principle, every effort must be 
made to interpret U.S. law in conformity with international 
law.21 Under the duty to protect, the United States cannot act 
(or fail to act) so that U.S.-based multinationals are able to vi-
olate human rights standards—and this is true not only in the 
United States, but outside the country’s territorial boundaries 
as well. Thus, any interpretation of U.S. law that would allow 
this to take place would not be consistent with American obli-
gations under international law. To return to the Southern Pe-
ru Copper situation, what this also means is that in this situa-
tion, by not applying U.S. environmental laws extrater-
ritorially, the United States has acted in a manner that is not 
consistent with the ICESCR.22 In that way, this failure to apply 
 
 18. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 18, May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S 331. 
 19. See, e.g., U.N. Comm. on Economic, Social & Cultural Rights, General 
Comment No. 15, The Right to Water, ¶¶ 20–29, U.N. Doc. E/C. 12/2002/11, 
(Jan. 20, 2003). 
 20. Unlike many other international human rights treaties, the ICESCR 
makes no mention of either “territory” or “jurisdiction.” Compare, e.g., 
ICESCR, supra note 17, art. 2(1) (“Each State Party to the present Covenant 
undertakes to take steps . . . with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate 
means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.”), with 
Torture Convention, supra note 14, art. 2(1) (“Each State Party shall take ef-
fective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of 
torture in any territory under its jurisdiction.”), and ICCPR, supra note 15, 
art. 2(1) (“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and 
to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction 
the rights recognized in the present Covenant . . . .”).  
 21. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). 
 22. See, e.g., ICESCR, supra note 17, art. 12(1) (“The State Parties to the 
present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the high-
est attainable standard of physical and mental health.”).  
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the law extraterritorially constitutes a violation of internation-
al law. 
  CONCLUSION   
In the past century, U.S. law has started to be applied out-
side the territorial boundaries of the United States. However, 
few would deny the haphazard nature of this enterprise. The 
Supreme Court has settled on two principles to guide its work. 
However, not only has the application of these principles been 
problematic, but so are the principles themselves.  
Jeffrey Meyer calls for more theoretical analysis and he 
sets forth a proposal that would give a territorial reading to 
U.S. law unless (1) Congress expressly calls for an extraterri-
torial application or (2) there is a jurisdictional link to the 
United States and what is being regulated under U.S. law is al-
so regulated by the law of another state. While this might pro-
vide more certainty in the application of the law than what ex-
ists at present, I am not convinced that this advances a proper 
understanding of the extraterritorial application of U.S. law. 
Rather than beginning with U.S. law, a much better place to 
start is with international law—and American obligations the-
reunder. 
